toward a rapprochement with the Chinese Communists was ravaged as "a treasonable betrayal of the national interest" and ultimately resulted in "the almost total paralysis of American policy in the Orient."
3 Over the course of the decade, the United States arrived at an announced policy to contain the spread of communism manifested by the People's Republic, known as "Red China," and take responsibility for the defense of the Nationalists on Taiwan, known as "Free China."
Chinese Nationalist Perspective
After the Chinese Communist takeover of the mainland in 1949, the desire to "return to the mainland" constituted the national objective for the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan. However, with each passing year, the prospects for a successful recovery by the GRC became increasingly remote. While the United States continued to support the GRC as the sole Chinese government amid growing international criticism, it was clear that the PRC had established its rule on the mainland and was not the "passing phase" referred to by Secretary of State Foster Rhea Dulles in 1957. Meanwhile, President Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and his government remained committed to recovering the mainland and insisted that a counteroffensive could be successful with proper planning and preparation. Realistically, however, a GRC attempt to recapture the mainland could not be executed independently, and the Chinese Nationalists realized that vast U.S. military assistance would be required in order for success to be viable.
In 1962, the GRC focused on mobilizing efforts to regain the mainland with repeated requests to the Kennedy administration to provide military support. However, the United States had firmly discouraged the use of force in the Taiwan Strait area, and Kennedy and his advisers were not willing to change U.S. posture in that regard without clear evidence that a military operation could be successful in its objectives. In ambassadorial talks with the Chinese Communists, which had begun in Geneva in 1954, the United States consistently advocated the renunciation of force in PRC dealings with the Chinese Nationalists; and concurrently, Washington required GRC adherence to the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty which stipulated prior consultation with the United States before the Nationalists engaged in military activity. In addition, the possibility of Soviet intervention in a U.S.-assisted Nationalist attack on the mainland posed a major deterrent to active U.S. participation in the GRC's mainland recovery efforts.
